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ABSTRACT: In the early postwar years Norway was among the most active in the campaign against Franco’s 
Spain, supporting the policy of keeping Spain out of the UN, and pushing for UN members to break off diplomatic 
relations with Spain. Within a few years the policy of ostracism was seen to fail as it appeared to strengthen rather 
than weaken the Franco regime. Spain was then gradually allowed into the warmth. Until the early 1950s Norway’s 
retreat from its 1946 position was very reluctant, and it was in 1949 the last Western European state to accept nor-
malization. Spain retaliated with economic pressures, and by 1951 Norway had relented and joined in the general 
reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations, and in 1955 accepted the package deal that brought Spain into the 
UN. The article discusses the foreign policy concerns and the domestic political struggles that explain Norwegian 
policies, including the veto on Spanish NATO membership that was never given up.
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RESUMEN: Antifascismo de pequeño Estado: el objetivo de Noruega de eliminar el régimen de Franco como con-
secuencia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.- En los primeros años de la posguerra Noruega fue uno de los países más 
activos en la campaña en contra de la España de Franco, apoyando la política de apartar a España fuera de las Nacio-
nes Unidas y presionando a los miembros de ésta a romper las relaciones diplomáticas con ella. En unos pocos años 
se comprobó el fracaso de la política del ostracismo, puesto que acabó por fortalecer, más que debilitar, el régimen 
franquista. A partir de entonces, las relaciones con España fueron templándose poco a poco. Hasta los primeros años 
cincuenta, la retractación noruega de su posición de 1946 resultó un tanto reacia, y no fue hasta 1949 cuando se con-
virtió en el último de los estados de Europa occidental en aceptar la normalización de la situación. España contraata-
có con presiones económicas y para 1951 Noruega ya había cedido su posición para unirse al restablecimiento gene-
ral de las relaciones diplomáticas normales, de manera que en 1955 aceptó el paquete de acuerdos que llevó a España 
a las Naciones Unidas. Este artículo analiza las relaciones internacionales y las luchas políticas domésticas que ex-
plican las políticas noruegas, incluyendo el veto al ingreso de España como miembro de la OTAN, que nunca fue 
levantado. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Política exterior noruega; Universalidad y membresía de Naciones Unidas; Aislamiento de la 
España de Franco; Membresía de la OTAN; Relaciones diplomáticas; Guerra comercial; Activismo de pequeño Esta-
do; Antifascismo.
Copyright: © 2018 CSIC. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.
Culture & History Digital Journal 7(1), June 2018, e008. eISSN 2253-797X, https://doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2018.008
2 • Helge Øystein Pharo
Norway’s short lived crusade to topple the Franco re-
gime after World War II bears witness to the enduring 
strength of broadly based sympathies for the republican 
forces in Spain during the Civil War. These sympathies 
were particularly strong within the ruling Labor Party and 
among the Communists and translated into efforts to have 
the United Nations isolate the Franco regime with the 
eventual goal of removing it. Within less than a year of 
the start of the crusade in 1946 Norway had to beat a rather 
ungraceful retreat. The process is analyzed within the 
context of the evolution of Norwegian foreign policy in 
the aftermath of the World War, and the domestic strug-
gles over the direction of foreign policy that were inti-
mately linked to the struggle for supremacy within the 
Labor movement. While anti-Franco sentiments were 
strong, Norwegian economic interests suffered as a con-
sequence of the campaign. To what extent did economics 
matter when Norway shelved its campaign? The transfor-
mation of Norway’s Spanish policies were certainly af-
fected by the passing of time and the firmly held belief of 
the Labor Government, and Foreign Minister Halvard M. 
Lange in particular, that the United Nations was to be a 
universal organization. In the long run it turned out, not 
even Spain could be ostracized.
We shall first look briefly at Norway’s foreign policy 
predicaments in the period of transition from War to Cold 
War, then move on to the deliberations, cabals and horse-
trading at the United Nations regarding the Franco regime 
until the early 1950s. Then we shall look more closely at 
the bilateral relations and the domestic struggles over 
Norway’s position on Spain in international organizations 
up to the mid 1950s.1
ThE NORWEgIAN FOREIgN POLICY 
TRADITION
Norway peacefully left the dual kingdom of Norway 
and Sweden in 1905, thus gaining complete sovereignty 
also in matters of foreign policy. The newly sovereign 
state declared its intention to stay out of entanglements 
with the European warrior states and to diligently pursue 
its foreign economic interests. Norway tried to have its 
neutrality guaranteed by the great powers. As that was not 
to be, Norwegian governments until the German surprise 
attack of April 1940, based their foreign and security poli-
cies on the assumption that the country’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity would be taken care of by an implicit 
British guarantee. As the Norwegians saw it, Britain 
would not tolerate another great power taking control of 
Norway, and British control of the adjoining seas would 
make it impossible for any such power to do so. Thus 
Norway would enjoy sovereignty and protection with 
minimal military effort of her own (Riste, 2005: 69-153). 
During World War I Norway stayed neutral, but pursued 
such a pro-British policy that the author of the standard 
work titled it: Norway: the Neutral Ally (Riste, 1965).
Norway joined the League of Nations rather reluctant-
ly and with considerable domestic opposition both from 
the socialists on the left and from the strongly nationalist 
right. Yet, as Britain was the key member of the League, 
successive Norwegian governments decided that Norway 
needed to join and stay in for both economic and security 
reasons (Fure, 1996: 181-185). However, Norway was 
not an enthusiastic member, did not commit itself to the 
military sanctions clause and only reluctantly to the eco-
nomic one. For all practical purposes Norway withdrew 
from the League after 1936. Internationalism of a legalis-
tic kind characterized its policies, in addition to occasion-
al small state activism, but essentially Norway chose exit 
over loyalty when push came to shove. Isolationism, neu-
tralism and skepticism of the great powers remained sta-
ples of foreign policy debates (Fure, 1996: 181-214; Ris-
te, 2005: 129-137). The belief in the implicit British 
guarantee was not due to any trust in British altruism, but 
was, as mentioned, founded on the assumption that Britain 
in its own interest would keep other states away. The 
Norwegians on the basis of their experiences in the Napo-
leonic Wars and World War I realized that in the last re-
sort they could not afford to be aligned with the oppo-
nents of Britain.
The German attack on 9 April 1940 made for a rude 
awakening. The British fleet proved to be neither a deter-
rent nor a significant obstacle to the Germans. The two 
months long campaign proved a disaster for the Norwe-
gians and the allied expeditionary forces. The lesson 
learnt by the smallish foreign policy elite was that the im-
plicit British guarantee was insufficient to maintain Nor-
way’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that out-
side support for the defense of the realm had to be 
prepared in peace time (Riste, 2005: 138-153; Sverdrup, 
1996: 15-61). As a consequence, by 1941 the Norwegian 
government-in-exile in London had placed itself firmly in 
the allied camp and turned into an avid supporter of a 
postwar North Atlantic alliance system. Isolationism of 
the interwar brand was given up, and neutrality was no 
longer an option for Norway (Riste, 2005: 154-169; Sver-
drup, 1996: 83-98).
When in 1944 the Americans made clear that such a 
system would not be compatible with the United Nations 
scheme, the British decided they had to fall in line with 
the Americans and at least for the time being abandon 
their North Atlantic plans. On their own they would not 
have the capability to protect Norway against another fu-
ture continental predator, be it Germany or the Soviet 
Union. The exile government then replaced western 
alignment with bridge-building, though without quite re-
alizing how the war had undermined British power.
The move to bridge-building was also prompted by 
the reemergence of the Soviet Union as the major power 
bordering on Norway, a liberator of the northernmost 
county from German occupation, and a claimant for what 
amounted to a condominium of Spitsbergen. In this situa-
tion the exile government, and its successor Labor gov-
ernments after the end of the war, decided to trust the 
United Nations to uphold Norway’s sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity. Such a change of policy presupposed 
that the allied great powers that created the United Na-
tions would be able to maintain a minimum of coopera-
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tion after the war, so that the Security Council would not 
be immobilized by the veto, making the UN unable to 
protect its member states. Norwegian foreign policy mak-
ers were perfectly aware of the possibility that the great 
powers might fall out. Bridge-building was tailored to 
help keep the former allies on friendly terms. Norway 
could at least chip in by not being seen to take side in 
East-West confrontations. If tension between the former 
allies nevertheless reached the point where war might be 
seen to threaten, Norway would seek a security guarantee 
from the Anglo-American powers. Thus bridge-building 
was conditional, and approaching the Western powers to 
ask for protection constituted the government’s reserve 
position. A majority of Norwegians, parliamentarians in 
particular, were most likely in no doubt who the potential 
protectors would be, even if they were ignorant of the re-
serve position. After the Americans launched the Mar-
shall Plan, and in particular after the Communist coup in 
Prague and Moscow’s alliance proposal to Finland in 
February of 1948, and rumors of a similar proposal to 
Norway, the Labor government started exploring the 
Western option (Sverdrup, 1996: 201-234, 277-302; Ris-
te, 2005: 173-177, 192-205; Pharo, 1976, 2014).
Bridge-building was not merely a means to stay out of 
great power confrontations and thus help keeping them on 
acceptably good terms, it crucially also represented a road 
to a domestic foreign policy consensus. The Communists 
and the Labor Party left wing were strongly critical of the 
capitalist West and the United States in particular. Main 
stream Labor was pro-British and admired Clement At-
tlee’s Labor government, but was also critical of the Unit-
ed States. The center-right parties were less united in their 
views, but skepticism of the Soviet Union was fairly wide-
spread among the Conservatives, and by late 1946 the 
newspapers of the center-right parties increasingly carried 
articles critical of the Soviet Union and the bridge-build-
ing policy. By the summer and fall of 1947 the foreign 
policy consensus was in fact disintegrating, also with 
regard to the Spanish issue. Tensions were by this time 
running high, and the Labor government had to handle 
foreign policy issues with great care as ideological 
commitments reinforced conflicting views of Norway’s 
security situation and the potential threats against its 
sovereignty and territory (Pharo, 1989, 2014; Eriksen, 1972).
ThE UNITED NATIONS AND ThE FRANCO 
REgIME
The United States and Britain had of need maintained 
a somewhat ambiguous relationship with Franco during 
the War, doing what they could to keep him from taking 
part in the war on the side of the Axis powers. Spain’s 
entry into the war would obviously constitute a serious 
threat to the Allied position in the Mediterranean. The So-
viet Union entertained no such ambiguities as backers of 
the Republicans during the Civil War and having been ex-
posed to the atrocities of the Spanish Blue Division on the 
Eastern Front. By the time the Allied powers founded the 
United Nations at the 1945 San Francisco conference, the 
US and Britain had moved closer to the Soviet position. 
According to a resolution proposed by Mexico the UN 
would be closed both to the former Axis powers and any 
regime brought to power with the help of the armed forc-
es of these powers (Luard, 1982: 361; Russel, 1959: 844-
845). The resolution was explicitly intended to keep 
Spain out until the Franco regime had been replaced, and 
was passed unanimously. Thus began the campaign 
against the Franco regime within the United Nations. The 
Big Three followed up in the Potsdam Communique of 2 
August 1945:
The Three Governments feel bound however, to make it 
clear that they for their part would not favor any appli-
cation for membership [in the UN] put forward by the 
present Spanish Government, which, having been 
founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, 
in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close 
association with the aggressor States, possess the quali-
fications necessary to justify such membership (FRUS, 
1945, 2: 1510).
The campaign to ostracize Spain reached new heights 
in early 1946, even as we can discern the beginning of its 
decline at the same time. Though the activists -individu-
als, organizations and governments- did not realize it, 
the campaign’s zenith was passed during the first few 
months of the year. In March the US, Britain and France 
issued a joint statement that expressed the hope that the 
Spanish people would find the means to bring about the 
peaceful withdrawal of Franco, and be able freely to 
choose their own leaders. They added, however, the caveat 
that they hoped this could be achieved without again 
subjecting the Spanish people “to the horrors and bitter-
ness of civil strife” (Botero, 2001: 115). As they were 
stepping up the pressure the Western great powers were 
also having second thoughts. The Franco government was 
showing considerable resilience in the face of isolation 
and international pressures. The Americans and the British 
were both concerned that they should not contribute to a 
resumption of the civil war, and they were worried that 
only the Soviet Union would benefit if that happened. 
Thus they objected to a French proposal in late March of 
1946 to impose a gasoline embargo and cut off all trade 
relations with Spain (Botero, 2001: 116).
As the Americans and the British were having second 
thoughts regarding punitive measures against Spain, and 
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated as a conse-
quence of disagreements over the peace treaties with the 
former Axis satellites and as a result of Soviet claims on 
Turkey and Iran, the states pushing the campaign against 
Franco gained only modest victories in the UN during 
1946. General Assembly Resolution 32 of 9 February reaf-
firmed Spain’s ineligibility for membership. Resolution 
39 of 12 December excluded the Franco Government 
from membership in any international agency related to 
the UN, and furthermore recommended that all member 
states recall their accredited ambassadors and ministers 
plenipotentiary from Madrid. With the exception of Ar-
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gentina, Portugal and the Vatican support for the resolu-
tion was universal (Botero, 2001: 116). Yet the December 
resolution also signified that the campaign against Franco 
was running out of steam. What eventually passed was a 
watered down version of what the Eastern Bloc and the 
activist Western states had wanted. The process leading to 
the resolution was exceedingly complex and confusing, 
but the Americans and the British eventually side-tracked 
a proposal that called for the termination of diplomatic 
relations between Spain and the member states of the UN 
(Botero, 2001: 115-116; Haraldstad, 1994: 44-475; Ship-
ulina, 2013: 22-32).
Between February and December 1946 the Americans 
and the British were on the one hand becoming increasingly 
worried by the economic situation in Spain, and on the oth-
er feared that outside pressures would merely strengthen 
Franco’s position as he would appeal to Spanish national-
ism. They were also becoming convinced that no viable al-
ternative to Franco existed, and that the outbreak of another 
civil war would completely exhaust the country. From 
Moscow George Kennan’s analyses of Soviet perceptions 
of the situation in Spain increased US worries and 
strengthened the determination not to support the more 
far-reaching proposals by Eastern bloc countries such as 
Poland and by western European activists such as Belgium 
and Norway. In Kennan’s view, the Soviets saw the situation 
in Spain as ripe for revolution, and consequently providing 
an opening for an expansion of Soviet influence in the western 
Mediterranean. At the same time support for the harsh 
anti-Franco posture was waning in the United States 
(FRUS, 1946, 5: 1033-1036; Botero, 2001: 115-118). 
Norway did not play a prominent role in the process 
leading to Resolution 32 in February, though Foreign 
Minister Lange, when reporting from the UN General As-
sembly in Parliament, claimed that the delegation had 
successfully pushed for a sharpening of the language 
(St.t. 1945-1946: 296). However, leading up to the fall 
General Assembly and the December Resolution 39, the 
Foreign Ministry and the UN delegation took a most ac-
tive part. The basis for this activism on the part of the 
Norwegian Government may be found in a compound of 
causes, some of them of an international nature, some of 
them of domestic origins. Clearly what triggered the Nor-
wegian engagement was the Franco regime’s execution of 
members of the opposition in February, which to Norwe-
gian activists brought back vivid memories of the Civil 
War and gave the pro-Republican forces a vitamin injec-
tion (Benum, 1969: 13-17). We shall return more fully to 
the domestic setting, and only look briefly into it at this 
point. We must also at this point take note of the fact that 
the anti-Franco campaign within the Storting as well as in 
the country at large was coordinated by the Spain Com-
mittee. It had been created during the Civil War and was 
resurrected in 1945 as a consequence of a Trade Union 
Council initiative. The Committee counted among its 
members prominent Labor parliamentarians (Benum, 
1969; Haraldstad, 1994).
Subsequent to the passing of Resolution 32 Lange in-
formed the Storting of the international status of the 
Spanish problem. The Communists and the Labor left 
pushed hard for a more uncompromising Norwegian ap-
proach than had been on display in February, which the 
government only with difficulty was able to modify. On 6 
March 1946 the Storting passed the following resolution:
The Storting hereby expresses its most earnest sympathy 
for the liberation struggle of the Spanish people. The 
Storting is fully confident that the cabinet will maintain 
close contact with the Storting and its subordinate parts 
with regard to this issue, in order that Norway may fully 
do its duty as a democratic state in an inter-allied effort to 
reestablish democracy in Spain (St.t., 1945-1946: 300).
The Storting resolution is notable for three reasons. In 
the first place the left wing critics of the Franco regime 
were clearly in doubt whether the Government would ac-
tually pursue a consistent anti-Franco policy in the UN as 
well as bilaterally, and wanted to nail the Government to 
the pursuit of such a policy. Secondly, the resolution 
marked the beginning of the activist phase of Norwegian 
policy with regard to Spain, in both arenas. Thirdly, the 
Government, and Lange in particular, were well aware 
that in a duel with Spain Norway was the weaker part un-
less it was part of a unified Western coalition. Thus the 
phrase “interallied effort” was included. Lange and the 
Cabinet were not willing to commit Norway to a lone 
confrontation that Norway was bound to lose (Harald-
stad, 1994: 43-44; Sverdrup, 1996: 246). In retrospect it 
may appear something of an anomaly that Norway was 
willing to join with the Soviet Union and its satellites and 
part ways with the West. However, during the early post-
war years such an alignment in an individual case was 
seen as a most appropriate expression of bridge-building. 
It might enhance the credibility of bridge-building to the 
Soviets, while not alienating the West. While Lange and 
the Cabinet knew Norway’s protectors would probably 
disapprove, Spain’s UN membership did not represent a 
crucial case in the emerging Cold War. However, as the 
Cold War fronts froze, such attempts at bridge-building 
would satisfy none of the antagonists (Mordt, 2003: 177; 
Pharo, 1976, 2014).
By the summer of 1946 Norway was pushing for 
much harsher measures against Spain within the frame-
work of the UN. Rumors in the press and the diplomatic 
grapevine had it that Britain and France were contemplat-
ing action against Franco. France was certainly pushing 
for action in the spring of 1946 without much to show for 
it, but by the time Lange met with Prime Minister Attlee 
in the summer of that year he was told in no uncertain 
terms that the British and the Americans were reluctant to 
support more punitive measures and feared that increased 
pressure might destabilize Spain. In their opinion there 
really were no credible alternatives to Franco. Pressure 
against Franco in fact appeared to strengthen rather than 
weaken him (Haraldstad, 1994: 44-48; Shipulina, 2013: 
28-29; Benum, 1969: 16-17; Sverdrup, 1996: 246-247).
During the fall of 1946 the Norwegians maintained 
their efforts to have the Spanish case discussed by the Gen-
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eral Assembly, and kept in contact with likeminded nations 
such as France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia, the latter be-
ing seen as Norway’s bridge-building counterpart in the 
East. Lange and the Cabinet were motivated by a mix of 
parliamentary pressure and their own deeply rooted disgust 
with the Franco regime as they were searching for a way to 
have diplomatic relations terminated by the UN members 
(Shipulina, 2013: 29; Sverdrup, 1996: 246-247). As we 
have seen, primarily due to US opposition the final text of 
Resolution 39 fell far short of that goal, even if it was more 
radical than what the Americans had wanted. While Lange 
and the Foreign Ministry had worked loyally according to 
the Storting resolution, the Foreign Minister in retrospect 
was clearly relieved that diplomatic relations with Spain 
were to be down-graded rather than broken off. The escape 
clause of the March Storting resolution provided adequate 
cover for the Foreign Minister, who in February 1947 fur-
ther modified the Norwegian position: “…that we within 
the framework of the United Nations would contribute to 
support a united effort that might lead to the reestablish-
ment of democracy in Spain” (Haraldstad, 1994: 43-45).
On the way to Resolution 39 Norway had proposed a 
modified version of the Polish proposal to break off diplo-
matic relations. Member states were to notify the Secre-
tary General by 16 January 1947 whether they were will-
ing to break off diplomatic relations with Spain, or 
whether in fact they did not have such relations. If two 
thirds of the member states had done so, the Secretary 
General should ask the states willing to do so to terminate 
relations. If less than two thirds of the members had ex-
pressed such willingness, the Secretary General should 
inform those that were willing that they were at liberty to 
do so (St. meld. 36, 1947: 19; Shipulina, 2013: 30-32). 
We have as yet not uncovered any evidence on what 
Lange and the Foreign Ministry thought of the prospects 
for success for this rather complicated proposal. We may, 
until possibly contradictory evidence becomes available, 
conclude that it was a face-saving proposal intended to 
keep the Storting happy. Eventually the watered-down 
version, to down-grade diplomatic relations and not allow 
Spain to become a member of affiliated organizations, 
was passed by a vote of 34 against 6. The US and Great 
Britain also voted yes (Shipulina, 2013: 30-32; St.meld. 
12, 1947: 20).
From then on the Spanish issue in the UN became the 
object of a tug-of-war between those states that wanted to 
confirm the December 1946 resolution and the growing 
number of states that worked to have the resolution re-
voked. In 1947 a proposal to confirm the 1946 resolution 
failed to gain a two thirds majority in the General Assem-
bly, and in 1949 a proposal to revoke Resolution 39 failed 
by one vote to gain a two thirds majority. Norway was the 
only state in Western Europe and the Americas to oppose 
the proposal, and in a sense cast the decisive no vote by 
going along with the Soviet bloc (Shipulina, 2013: 33-38; 
Haraldstad, 1994: 46-47). The following year the General 
Assembly revoked Resolution 39 by a vote of 37 in fa-
vour, 10 against and 12 abstaining. The Soviet bloc uni-
formly voted against, while on this occasion no Western 
democracy joined them. Britain, France and the Scandi-
anvian countries were among those abstaining, while the 
United States voted yes (Haraldstad, 1994: 58). Within a 
short while the heads of mission returned to Madrid, Rolf 
Andersen for Norway in 1951.
At the same time as the heads of mission reassembled 
in Madrid, Spain gained entry to a number of UN affiliat-
ed agencies, starting with the Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization in 1950, then the International Postal Union, 
the World Health Organization and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization in 1951. None of these member-
ships caused any Norwegian protests or even misgivings. 
When the issue of Spanish membership in the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
was tabled in May 1952, however, the strength of the anti-
Franco forces in Norway again proved itself. Lange 
brought the membership matter to the attention of the 
Cabinet. His colleagues agreed that Norway should voice 
no objections to Spanish membership. Before long, how-
ever, the opposition took to the field. The Spain committee 
was joined by the Trade Union Council and Labor’s youth 
movement in opposition. The youth movement frequently 
opposed Labor’s foreign policy during the Cold War.
When the Swedes indicated that they would abstain, 
the Labor government eventually decided to join forces 
with their social democratic kin, to the chagrin of Spain 
which feared that the Scandinavian abstentions might 
prove decisive in blocking membership. The Spanish 
Government again threatened to bring sanctions to bear 
on Norway, as they had done repeatedly from 1947 on-
wards, and the Norwegian embassy transmitted regrets 
over the negative Norwegian stance, which in their opin-
ion brought to naught their efforts over the preceding year 
to improve relations (Haraldstad, 1994: 59-60).
Within three years Spain would be admitted to the 
United Nations as part of an extensive package deal that 
admitted a large number of both pro-Western and Com-
munist countries in a balanced way. As the allies turned 
bitter rivals soon after the end of the war, they also in-
creasingly diverged on the criteria for UN membership. 
Deadlocks over membership proposals ensued, and the 
process leading to the package deal was both slow and 
laborious (Luard, 1982: 361-372). Norway welcomed the 
package deal and offered no objections to Spanish mem-
bership. Even the Spain Committee did not object to what 
in retrospect appears a rather dramatic change of course. 
Haraldstad explains this remarkable change by assuming 
that Norwegian public opinion, and that would include 
the Spain Committee and its followers, had gradually 
come to accept the universality principle with regard to 
UN membership (Haraldstad, 1994: 69-74). However, the 
universality principle had been part and parcel of Norwe-
gian UN policies since 1945, Spain and the former Axis 
satellites represented the exceptions to the rule. That, of 
course, may not invalidate Haraldstad’s argument. Her 
point is that public opinion, not the Cabinet nor the For-
eign Ministry, had changed course with regard to the 
principle. That is certainly conceivable, but she provides 
no direct evidence for her conclusion. She merely points 
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to the assumed shift in public opinion and the disappear-
ance of lobby groups and parliamentary pressures. What-
ever the merit of the universality argument, we obviously 
have to look further for a satisfactory explanation, and at 
least try to sort out why universality made such an impact 
on an issue that was certainly more important than UNESCO 
membership a mere three years earlier. 
The Norwegian retreat must partly be explained in 
terms of the sheer futility of the process of ostracism. 
There was never a two thirds majority in the General As-
sembly that wanted to break off diplomatic relations. 
Furthermore the half-measures that were carried were 
seen to consolidate the Franco regime rather than weak-
en it. The United States moved from supporter to oppo-
nent of anti-Franco measures within two years of the end 
of the war. By the fall of 1947 the State Department and 
the President had come to share George Kennan’s analy-
sis that pointed to the necessity for propping up rather 
than undermining Franco (Botero, 2001: 117-120; 
FRUS, 1947, 3: 1091-1095). The Congress and the US 
military favored including Franco in the Western line-up, 
i.e. the Marshall Plan and the OEEC as well as NATO. 
Neither President Harry S. Truman nor Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson would go along with such proposals in the 
late 1940s, not the least because they knew that it would 
antagonize not merely the Northern European Social 
Democrats but also the British and French Governments. 
Nevertheless the US first only inched towards including 
Spain and then, after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
galloped to bring Spain into the Western system by the 
Madrid agreements of 1953 on economic aid and defense 
cooperation. By that time Spain was also invited into the 
OEEC negotiations on the Green Plan regarding trade in 
agricultural and other primary sector products (Botero, 
2001: 120-166; Haraldstad, 1994: 75-79; Eriksen and 
Pharo, 1997: 47-49).
Historians have as yet found no indications that the 
US applied direct pressure on Norway in any of these 
cases. We may still assume, though, that knowledge of 
the US positions and of the pressure that Congress, the 
military and to a degree broader public opinion put on the 
Truman and later on the Eisenhower administration to 
bring in Spain, caused the Norwegian Government to 
have second thoughts about their position on Spain and 
the United Nations. The Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet 
were certainly also aware that given the large number of 
dictatorships/one party states of a fairly unsavory nature 
that were and would become members, the insistence on 
keeping Spain out might be considered somewhat as an 
exhibition of moral and political double standards. By the 
early 1950s Norwegian critics of the Spanish policy 
pointed this out with increasing frequency (Haraldstad, 
1994: 67-74, 116-124). The fact that Spain gained entry 
through a package deal may also be part of the explana-
tion for Norway’s acquiescence. In the first place, the 
great power agreement was in perfect harmony with La-
bor’s visions for the future of East-West relations. Sec-
ondly, the fact that the deal allowed the entry of a number 
of people’s democracies must have served to silence crit-
ics on the left (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997: 15-28, 44-50, 
405-417).
Altogether there were a large number of factors pulling 
in the same direction, and with only modest relevant ar-
chival evidence available, we shall probably never be 
able to sort out which were the most important. Certainly 
the fact that the memories of World War II and in particu-
lar of the Spanish Civil War were fading must be taken 
into account. The emergence of the Cold War gradually 
turned Spain from an adversary to a potential ally, at least 
as seen by the Americans who footed most of the Allied 
Cold War bill. The outbreak of the war in Korea, and the 
dismal outlook for the defense of Western Europe in the 
case of a Soviet onslaught made the peninsula increas-
ingly important. Conceivably more important from the 
Norwegian point of view, the semi-measures clearly did 
not work. Seen from the outside they were counter-pro-
ductive in that Franco’s position appeared to be strength-
ened rather than weakened. Certainly, as long as ostracism 
was imposed there was no room for Spanish alternatives 
to develop.
Finn Moe, chairman of the Storting Foreign Relations 
Committee, former ambassador to the UN, and Lange’s 
rival for the position as Foreign Minister in 1946, was the 
first leading Labor politician publicly to take issue with 
the reigning orthodoxy. In a newspaper interview in the 
summer of 1952 he declared that he held the somewhat 
heretical opinion “…that I cannot oppose Spanish mem-
bership in the UN, which has as its main task the mainte-
nance of peace in the world. It is a goal that would be 
more easily achieved if all countries were members of the 
organization. Thus every country ought to be a member.” 
Even if domestic reactions were quite adverse, Moe’s 
point made an impact even on the most committed critics 
of the Spanish regime (Haraldstad, 1994: 69). In essence, 
what he said was that in international affairs a bit of prag-
matism might be useful when principles only lead to a 
dead end. For far too long, as Lange’s closest adviser 
Arne Ording put it already in early February of 1947, 
Spain had been “a matter of religion” (Mordt, 2003: 226).
Moe’s comments confirm Haraldstad’s thesis with re-
gard to the importance of the universality principle. How-
ever, to fully grasp why the principle eventually brought 
ostracism to an end we need to bear in mind that Labor’s 
leadership already had reached the conclusion that their 
Spanish policy was most likely counterproductive in 
terms of Norwegian economic interests, alliance policies, 
and the functioning of the UN. Even so, on NATO Nor-
wegian governments would not budge. Norway remained 
staunchly opposed to Spanish membership until after the 
death of Franco, and because of the unanimity rule was 
able to keep Spain out (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997: 48-50). 
The Spanish Government, correctly seeing Norway as the 
main opponent of membership, rather gleefully pointed to 
what they considered Norwegian double standards. Ac-
cording to a December 1955 State Department memoran-
dum of conversation: “…it seemed a paradox to the Span-
iards that the one nation in NATO which most violently 
opposed the admission to NATO was also the nation 
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which denied the US access to bases on its national terri-
tory (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997: 48; FRUS, 1955-1957, 27: 
558). Spanish opponents of the regime disagreed, of 
course. They expressed their […deeply felt …] gratitude 
to the Foreign Ministry of the noble and heroic Norwe-
gian people” (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997: 48). 
We shall return to NATO in the concluding section, 
but first turn to the reasons why the campaign against 
Franco remained alive and well for so long, despite sus-
tained criticism from powerful Norwegian interests and at 
the same time declining popular interest in the matter 
from the late 1940s.
NORWAY AND FRANCO’S SPAIN-A TROUBLED 
RELATIONShIP
The United Nations General Assembly, the commit-
tees and the corridors were the locations where the major 
as well as the minor actors promoted their views and took 
their positions on whether to blacklist the Franco regime 
or have it admitted to the international system as a legiti-
mate player. As a fervent believer in the long term impor-
tance of the United Nations for the creation of a more just 
and peaceful world, Norway took its role in the delibera-
tions most seriously with a view to strengthening the or-
ganization as well as safeguarding its own interests (Erik-
sen and Pharo, 1997: 15-28, 405-417; Sverdrup, 1996: 
183-198; Riste, 2005: 183-185). The deliberations at UN 
headquarters were certainly important for how the Labor 
Cabinet made up its mind, but even more important were 
the ones taking place in Oslo. That is where the guide-
lines for the positions taken in the General Assembly and 
the committees were constructed. That is where the dilem-
mas of action or inaction were sorted out as the Cabinet 
found itself in the cross-fires between the Norwegian 
pro-Republican advocates, strong and increasingly frus-
trated economic interests, and growing dissatisfaction on 
the center-right of the political spectrum and among many 
ordinary Norwegians. In addition to the tension created 
by the domestic fault lines, the Franco Government added 
to tensions and dilemmas by threatening to or actually ex-
erting economic pressure on Norway (Haraldstad, 1994: 
43-74; Sverdrup, 1996: 251-256).
Edgeir Benum in his controversial yet much ac-
claimed M.phil. thesis from 1969 claimed that the Nor-
wegian initiatives and positions taken in the UN were in-
tended to divert attention from what Lange and the 
Cabinet primarily wanted, i.e. a normalization of relations 
with Spain (Benum, 1969: 9-12, 47-87, 123-135). His 
analysis has been subjected to sustained criticism in sub-
sequent years. The extreme version he presented, that the 
government all the way was looking for ways to recog-
nize Spain, clearly cannot be sustained by the currently 
available archival evidence, in fact barely by the evidence 
he himself had at his disposal at the time. Those in La-
bor’s leadership most concerned with the Spanish issue, 
in addition to Foreign Minister Lange, Prime Minister Ei-
nar Gerhardsen and the powerful Secretary General 
Haakon Lie, were all front line figures in the campaigns 
against Franco during the Civil War and strongly commit-
ted to having Franco replaced by a democratic regime 
(Mordt, 2003: 224; Sverdrup, 1996: 254-255). Just as the 
majority of Norwegians after the end of the World War 
they thought the survival of the Franco regime an anoma-
ly, and were seriously concerned with eradicating the last 
vestiges of Fascism. 
No matter how important the Spanish issue could be 
made out to be by the left wing foreign policy opposition, 
as far as the Cabinet was concerned it could not be al-
lowed to trump the more vital tasks of reconstruction and 
economic modernization. For the purpose of rebuilding 
and developing the Norwegian economy, extremely trade 
dependent, Norway also relied on imports from Spain: 
zinc for the metallurgical industry, phosphates for agri-
culture and salt for the fisheries. Key Norwegian ex-
porters were dependent upon the Spanish market, those of 
dried and salted cod and paper and pulp in particular. Fur-
thermore, in shipping Norway was a major cross-trader 
and Spanish ports of call were vital in particular for those 
ships plying the Mediterranean.2 Lange, as was also the 
case with his predecessor Trygve Lie, who had recently 
been appointed the first Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, was acutely aware that Norway was in an ex-
tremely weak position if Franco decided to employ eco-
nomic pressure. Accordingly the Cabinet was disinclined 
to risk any sort of action that would land the country in a 
solitary position or in a position where Norway parted 
ways with all the other Western democracies. Such was 
the political context for Norwegian support for the three-
power declaration of the United States, Great Britain and 
France in the spring of 1946. They saw it as the starting 
point in a process that might lead to the removal of Fran-
co without the risk of another civil war in Spain and with-
out exposing Norway to the sort of confrontations with 
Spain that Norway was bound to lose (Sverdrup, 1996: 
245-246).
The Cabinet was not, however, allowed smooth sail-
ing by Parliament. The Communists launched their offen-
sive on 6 March, when representative Randulf Dalland 
posed the following question: “Has the government as yet 
taken any action with regard to breaking off all relations 
with Franco-Spain?” (Sverdrup, 1996: 246-248; St.t. 
1945-1946: 296-297). The question was obviously in-
tended to put the Labor Government on the spot, and it 
succeeded quite well. Lange and the Cabinet were well 
aware that sentiments ran high after the executions in 
February, and they certainly shared the prevailing popular 
disgust with Spain. On the other hand, as we have seen, 
they were convinced that a Norwegian initiative without 
broad international support had the potential to cause 
grievous harm to Norwegian reconstruction without in 
the least hurting Spain. 
The Communists were certainly committed to the re-
moval of Franco. Members of the Party identified with 
the opposition exile government in France; some had 
fought as volunteers in the Civil War, and among them 
were athletes who had gone to Spain in 1936 to compete 
in the workers’ Olympics that year. Furthermore the Party 
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loyally adhered to the foreign policy positions laid down 
by Moscow (Stenersen, 1991).
To fully understand the bitterness of this struggle over 
the Spanish issue and the stakes involved, we need both 
to keep in mind the struggle over bridge-building and to 
take a brief look at the history of the Norwegian Labor 
Movement. In 1921 the Norwegian Labor Party, having 
taken a sharp turn to the left during World War I, decided 
to join the Comintern, as the only one of the Western Eu-
ropean socialist parties. A split followed immediately. A 
sizable minority exited and formed the Social Democratic 
Party. After a brief membership period the Labor Party 
quit the Comintern in opposition to Moscow’s demands 
for Norwegian subservience. A new minority formed a 
Norwegian Communist Party and remained in the Comin-
tern, while the more moderate Social Democrats in 1927 
merged with the main force, still named the Norwegian 
Labor Party. The Communists were in the wilderness for 
the remainder of the interwar period, while Labor, still 
revolutionary, formed a very short-lived minority govern-
ment in 1928. In 1935 a far more reformist Labor Party 
formed another minority government, this time based on 
a firm labor-farmer compromise that lasted until the Ger-
man attack in 1940. The interwar Labor government 
formed the core of the government-in-exile that together 
with the King and Crown Prince left Norway for London 
in June 1940 on the cruiser Devonshire (Maurseth, 1987; 
Pryser, 1987).
After the German capitulation Labor in the early sum-
mer of 1945 formed a transitional government led by Ein-
ar Gerhardsen who had spent the better part of the war in 
concentration camp. He kept on a small number of the key 
members of the exile government, foremost amongst them 
the Foreign Minister Trygve Lie and the Defense Minister 
Oscar Torp, party chairman during the interwar period. 
After the fall elections Labor formed a new government 
with Gerhardsen continuing as premier, and Trygve Lie 
staying on as foreign minister until February 1946. Until 
1961 Labor enjoyed an absolute majority in the Storting, 
and stayed in power until 1965 with the support of a left-
ish splinter party. Thus with the exception of three weeks 
in 1963, Labor was continuously in power for some 30 
years if we include the wartime period. The party was, 
however, quite frequently rent by a number of fissures 
over domestic as well as foreign policy issues, and its par-
liamentary caucus was at times in a state of near rebellion, 
particularly over foreign policy issues, the Spanish being 
one of the most controversial and long lasting.3
After decades in the wilderness the Communists came 
out of World War II as a major force in Norwegian poli-
tics, due to their resistance activities after Germany at-
tacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941, and also as a 
consequence of a more general radicalization of Norwe-
gian politics that followed upon the war, and indeed also 
because of a broadly based admiration and compassion 
for the Soviet Union’s wartime efforts and great suffer-
ing. The norwegian-Soviet Friendship Association gained 
an impressive roster of members, including some very re-
spectable members of the center-right parties and the so-
cial, academic and economic elite, spear-headed by Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997: 61).
The Communists in 1945 gained just less than 12 per 
cent of the vote, significantly behind Labor with just over 
40 per cent, but nearly in the same League as the Con-
servatives and the Liberals, the two major center-right 
parties of the interwar period, and ahead of the other two 
center-right parties, the Agrarians and the Christian Peo-
ples Party (Bergh, 1987: 12). Labor and the Communists 
both cooperated and competed, in the trade unions in par-
ticular, and for a period in 1945 negotiated over a possi-
ble party merger (Christensen, 1970).6 Representative 
Dalland’s question in the Storting was not merely intend-
ed to bring the government’s position out in the open and 
push it to the left, but was also a move in the struggle 
with Labor over the voter potential of the left. Dalland’s 
question was furthermore an indication of Communist 
and Soviet suspicions that Labor was not a trust-worthy 
bridge-builder. It was no secret that the government-in-
exile for some time during the war had contemplated a 
close postwar western alignment (Riste, 2005: 160-170; 
Sverdrup, 1996: 89-98).
The Communists were fully aware that Labor was far 
from united on foreign policy issues, either with regard to 
relations with the western great powers and the Soviet 
Union, or over how to deal with Franco Spain. The Spain 
Committee handled relations with Spanish exiles and 
similar organizations in other countries, and coordinated 
visits by Spanish exiles, protest marches and demonstra-
tions. It wielded considerable influence both within the 
Labor Party parliamentary caucus, the trade unions and 
Labor’s youth movement. These were also the bases for 
the most ardent supporters of bridge-building who were 
frequently suspicious of the Cabinet as being rather spine-
less in its pursuit that policy (Eriksen, 1972; Pharo, 1976, 
2014).
The Communists then were able to pursue their own 
goals and those of Moscow with regard to the Franco’s 
regime and at the same time score points in the domestic 
debate over Norwegian foreign policy. Dalland’s ques-
tion, we may assume, was not least intended to bring out 
in the open the internal tensions within the Labor Party. 
They were spot on, and forced the Government to accept 
a more strongly worded and more binding resolution that 
would reduce the Cabinet’s potential to freely pursue 
what it conceived as Norway’s best interests within the 
UN. The Communist initiative was picked up by the re-
spected Labor parliamentarian Gustav Natvig-Pedersen, 
formerly of neutralist and pacifist leanings and soon to be 
both speaker of the Storting and member of the Norwe-
gian Nobel Committee. Natvig-Pedersen was no maver-
ick leftist who could be bullied or neglected by the party 
leadership. In 1946 and until late 1947 the Communists 
could play on mainstream Labor parliamentarians who 
still harbored the idealist and neutralist sentiments that 
prevailed in the party in the 1930s.4 After the Commu-
nists sided with Moscow over the Marshall Plan, they 
were again out in the cold. Yet the leftish Labor Party for-
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eign policy opposition managed quite well on its own, 
and remained a thorn in the side of the leadership through-
out the Cold War, even if Spain by the mid 1950s was no 
longer a major symbol for the left opposition.
To understand the Spanish problem in Norwegian for-
eign policy we do not require access to Spanish archives. 
The issue had a life of its own in Norway. On the other 
hand, more extensive access to Spanish archives than was 
given to Hilde Haraldstad would certainly be helpful in 
sorting out how Spain saw the Norwegians and the poten-
tial costs to respectively Spain and Norway of the con-
frontational approach chosen. However, while access to 
Spanish archives would potentially put the Norwegian 
domestic debates into a broader context, it is not likely to 
bring us to a different understanding of the Norwegian 
debate and the decisions of the Labor Cabinet that were 
made under constant pressure from the foreign policy op-
position.
The Norwegian offensive against Spain was first 
about toppling the Franco regime by means of United Na-
tions resolutions. Whether the activists would have been 
prepared to propose military action has not been a topic in 
the historiography. As the plans for a UN force never ma-
terialized, this is a moot question. As regime change from 
late 1946 basically became a non-issue, the struggle be-
tween the Franco regime on the one side and the Norwe-
gian government and the opposition factions on the other 
atrophied into one of symbols and prestige. The Spanish 
government for good reasons expected to be treated as a 
legitimate government. It was in indisputable control of 
its territory, and international disapproval gradually re-
ceded. The Labor left opposition as well as the govern-
ment eventually accepted that the Franco regime was 
there to stay. By 1950 the government had decided that 
diplomatic representation on equal terms could not be 
avoided (Haraldstad, 1994: 15-18).
The 1946 parliamentary resolution was passed at a 
time when regime change in Spain was still conceivable. 
By the late summer of 1946 outside action for regime 
change was highly unlikely. The US and the UK had de-
cided that removing Franco was too risky both in terms of 
the situation in Spain and because mainly the Soviets 
stood to gain in such an event. By the spring of 1947 even 
the Norwegian Labor government had concluded that 
 regime change brought about from the outside was no 
longer an option. Labor’s parliamentary caucus shared 
that conclusion, but was in no mood to draw the obvious 
conclusion that normalization of diplomatic and trade 
 relations would be the next step (Haraldstad, 1994:  15-20; 
Sverdrup, 1996: 246-257).
The two countries had not properly reestablished diplo-
matic relations after the World War. After the end of the 
Civil War they maintained diplomatic relations at the lev-
el of minister for about a year. In 1940 Spain recalled its 
representative from German occupied Oslo, while Nor-
way throughout the War maintained a lower level repre-
sentative in Madrid. The Norwegian minister in Madrid 
passed away in 1940. In 1946 the Spanish Foreign Minis-
ter sought to reestablish diplomatic relations with Nor-
way at the level of minister as Spain had already done 
with Denmark and Sweden. The Spanish initiatives were 
cold-shouldered by Norway. Norway wanted to limit 
trade to vital imports and exports, and trade was conduct-
ed as private compensatory deals; there was no trade 
agreement between the two parties, also differently from 
Denmark and Sweden. The Spanish government found 
the situation most unsatisfactory on both counts (Sver-
drup, 1996: 246-256).
In 1947 Franco seized the initiative and turned the ta-
bles on the Norwegians. The Spanish government 
launched an initiative that ended in the reestablishment of 
mutual diplomatic relations at the level of minister in 
1951, ambassador from 1957, and a formal trade agree-
ment preceded diplomatic relations by a few months. The 
Spanish campaign was launched in early 1947 by way of 
two memoranda that were presented to the Norwegian 
chargé d’affaires in Madrid on respectively 5 January and 
11 February. In the first one Spain made the charge that 
Norway unilaterally restricted trade with Spain, and 
threatened to close Spanish ports to Norwegian shipping. 
In the second Spain demanded that Norway accept a 
chargé d’affaires in Oslo, so it would be represented at 
the same level as Norway in Madrid (Sverdrup, 1996: 
251-252).
The process leading to normalization was long and 
tortuous, and the intra-party struggles within Labor were 
fierce. Both issues were discussed at length in the Stort-
ing Foreign Relations Committee. Lange and the Cabinet 
were convinced that they had to accept the Spanish de-
mands for a trade agreement. The Spanish market and 
shipping services were vital to the Norwegian economy, 
and Lange pointed out that Norway by this time was the 
only Western state not to have a trade agreement with 
Spain. He assumed there was a real danger that the Span-
ish market might be completely lost. The Cabinet had de-
cided it needed to back down. The Cabinet knew it could 
muster a parliamentary majority for such a decision, but it 
did not know whether a majority of their own representa-
tives would vote in favor. After several meetings in the 
Labor parliamentary caucus and heavy handed pressure 
by Prime Minister Gerhardsen the opposition caved in. 
On 22 March the Storting by a vote of 110 against 13, two 
Labor representatives joined the Communists, agreed to 
reestablish normal trade relations with Spain (Sverdrup, 
1996: 252-253).
The Spanish demand for proper diplomatic relations 
was more difficult for Lange to accept, even though it 
was quite obvious that the two issues were linked and that 
there would be no deal on trade without diplomatic recog-
nition. Lange’s reluctance was clearly a matter also of 
personal disgust, but eventually he concluded that there 
was no way escaping recognition. The matter was cleared 
with the Foreign Relations committee in late May 1947 
and publicly announced in early June. Adverse reactions 
were much milder than expected, possibly because the 
Spanish representative would be based in Copenhagen to 
begin with. He arrived in Oslo only in the fall of 1947 
(Sverdrup, 1996: 253-254). 
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However, no trade deal was concluded until 1951. 
Spain exploited its strengthened position to push for an 
upgrade of diplomatic relations, and repeatedly threat-
ened to impose economic sanctions. From 1948 Norway 
was put in the position of suitor for a trade agreement, 
with concomitant rumblings in the parliamentary Labor 
Party. Extra-parliamentary forces increasingly joined the 
fray. In the early stages the most vocal and numerous had 
been those on the left, the Spain Committee, the dock 
workers, the Communists and Labor left wingers. From 
the right shipping interests and exporters certainly also 
gave voice to their misgivings in the early phases, but in 
public debate they were largely drowned out. As the po-
tentially disastrous effects of the policy of ostracism be-
came increasingly obvious, the opposition gained 
strength, guided, funded and gradually organized by the 
Ship-owners Association. Conservative newspapers 
joined the chorus criticizing the Labor Government for its 
lack of realism and the harmful effects on Norwegian 
economic interests (Haraldstad, 1994: 8-42).
At the same time anti-Franco sentiment, even if wan-
ing, remained quite strong, and the activists kept staging 
anti-Franco events far into the 1950s, when similar organ-
izations in other Western European states had either fold-
ed or were in the process of being closed down. After the 
establishment of diplomatic relations demonstrations 
were staged outside the Spanish embassy. In 1952 a rep-
resentative of the Giral exile government was invited to 
the May Day events in Oslo, and the Spain Committee 
even tried to put him on the stand together with the Prime 
Minister. The latter attempt proved a flop, but the anti-
Franco forces remained quite strong for a remarkably 
long time, even while Norway gradually normalized rela-
tions and accepted Spanish membership also in Western 
organizations that were not universal in nature (Harald-
stad, 1994: 43-98).
Part of the explanation for the sustained opposition is 
no doubt to be found in another of Arne Ording’s diary 
entries in February of 1947 concerning the revolt of the 
Labor Party parliamentary caucus upon the issue of how 
to handle the two Spanish memoranda. He returned to the 
religious imagery of the previous week quoted above: 
“The whole mess is motivated by domestic political con-
cerns. Spain has become religion, and all bottled-up dis-
satisfaction is channeled into this issue.” (Mordt, 2003: 
228). Dissatisfaction with Norwegian foreign policy on 
the part of the Labor left remained strong throughout the 
1950s, and in 1961 was the main cause for the founding 
of the Socialist Peoples Party, mostly made up of Labor 
left wingers with a few former Communists and inde-
pendent Socialists thrown in (Kvam jr., 1973).
The Labor leadership eventually, though with consid-
erable regrets, gave up fighting a lost battle, even though 
rearguard skirmishes took place well into the 1950s, 
mostly provoked by the rank and file who took much 
longer to learn to live with defeat. On one battle field, 
however, the Norwegians did not yield. Franco’s Spain 
was not to become a NATO member. For a new state to 
be admitted, all members had to agree. When the final de-
cisions on Norwegian membership in NATO were taken 
in the late winter of 1949 Lange told the Labor parlia-
mentary caucus: “We cannot imagine a socialist country 
voting in favor of Spanish membership. If we end up 
standing alone, that is what we will do.” (Haraldstad, 
1996: 100). His promise was conceivably essential to cre-
ate an overwhelming Labor majority in favor of taking 
Norway into NATO. At the same time it clearly commu-
nicated his strongly held personal views.
When Spain by the middle of the 1950s expressed in-
creasing interest in NATO membership, strongly support-
ed by the Americans, Lange and Gerhardsen reiterated 
their positions. On a Foreign Ministry memo discussing 
Spanish views of their chances of being let in, Lange 
minuted: “We need to oppose this tooth and claw as long 
as possible. NATO is something different from the UN 
and the universality principle does not apply” (Harald-
stad, 1996: 111). In an interview with a major left-leaning 
Norwegian daily, Gerhardsen on 15 July stated: 
If there were to be a concrete proposal to include Spain 
as a member, I assume that it cannot be supported by 
Norway. In Norway we are of the opinion that NATO 
will be weakened by Spanish membership. This concern 
is widely shared by the Storting and the Norwegian peo-
ple (Haraldstad, 1994: 112).
The Labor government would not yield on the mem-
bership issue, and the subsequent center-right govern-
ment did not change course. Memories of the civil war 
were certainly important, as was the looming threat that 
any false step on the Spanish issue would threaten the 
quite fragile Norwegian foreign policy consensus. Fur-
thermore, for the generation coming of age in the inter-
war period, the civil war in Spain has been likened to the 
Vietnam War as a formative experience. The interwar 
generation dominated Norwegian politics from 1945 to 
the early 1970s. The way the Spain and NATO issue was 
handled, of course, also in the end served to strengthen 
Labor’s foreign policy credibility at home, which with 
German membership in NATO and the transition to mas-
sive retaliation as NATO strategy was vital.
We should also introduce more overarching themes 
that stand out in studies of Norwegian foreign policy. 
Olav Riste, Geir Lundestad and Rolf Tamnes in a number 
of works have all pointed to a missionary impulse and a 
strong moralistic strain in Norwegian foreign policy 
(Pharo, 2004, 2005, 2014). Without doubt such elements 
should be taken into consideration, as they frequently do 
not easily coexist with a realist adaptation to international 
power relationships. However, not just Labor in power 
but also Norwegian foreign policy makers more generally 
have tended to see realism and idealism not as opposites 
but rather as complementary. In order to maintain a func-
tioning and liberal world order democratic ideals should 
be observed even if in some cases and in the short run 
they might appear to undermine the position of the West. 
Idealism as realism clearly had its shortcomings, Lange 
realized, and he was probably quite frightened by Ger-
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hardsen’s occasional propensity to wishful thinking, en-
tering what Lange must have considered as never-never 
land. Yet, as far as we can tell in retrospect, Lange never 
let go of his belief that foreign policy was about moral is-
sues as well, even if by his critics he has mainly been por-
trayed as an astute NATO chess player. 
NOTES
1  At this stage in my research I rely heavily on two M. phil. theses, 
Benum (1969) and Haraldstad (1994), an MA thesis, Shipulina 
(2013), and the 1996 monograph by Sverdrup (1996), vol. 4 in 
the History of Norwegian Foreign Relations. Most references to 
the primary sources are through these works and others. The most 
important archives are those of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, up to 1969 available at the Norwegian National Archives 
in Oslo. The parliamentary proceedings are very important 
for this study, Stortingstidende (St.t.), the verbatim record of de-
bates, and the white papers, Stortingsmeldinger (St.meld.) in par-
ticular. At the Storting archive the minutes of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee are available for researchers up to about 1980. This 
article is also, of course, informed by some 40 years of work on 
Norwegian foreign relations, including co-authorship of vol. 5 in 
the History of Norwegian Foreign Relations (Eriksen and Pharo, 
1997). Olav Riste chaired the steering committee for this multi-
volume history, and produced a one volume English version (Ris-
te, 2005). For a historiography of Norwegian foreign relations, 
see Pharo (2004). All translations from the Norwegian are my 
own.
2 Haraldstad (1994) provides a very informative overview of the 
economic relationship. For the linkage between reconstruction 
and bridge-building, see Pharo (1976).
3 The struggles within the Labor Party and between Labor and the 
Communists are portrayed in the six volume history of the Labor 
Movement in Norway. The most relevant in this context are Maur-
seth (1987) and Bergh (1987), respectively volumes 3 and 5.
4 Eriksen (1972) is still the most comprehensive and incisive anal-
ysis of disagreements and struggles on the left over foreign poli-
cy issues. See also Pharo (2014). The neutralists and great power 
sceptics, who constituted the majority in the Labor Party in the 
interwar period, were by and large pushed on to the sidelines 
from 1945 onwards. From there the most leftish of them pursued 
consistent sniper activity. Most of them, however, were mainly 
on the lookout for a more positive Norwegian foreign policy, 
which they could find not just in opposing NATO expansion in 
the south of Europe or in a quest for a nuclear free Nordic zone, 
but also in the field of development aid. Natvig- Pedersen was an 
early aid enthusiast.
5 Haraldstad, H. (1994) Franco-Spain’s greatest enemy? Norway’s 
relations with Franco-Spain, 1946-1950. University of Oslo: Un-
published M. phil. thesis in history.
6 Christensen, Egil (1970) From unification dreams to normalcy. 
On the cooperation negotiations between the Labor Party and 
the Communists in 1945. University of Oslo: Unpublished M. 
phil. thesis in history.
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